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Case Study two: Local Authorities (LAs) and the Troubled Families programme LAs	face	many	challenges	as	they	seek	to	identify	and	work	with	‘troubled	families’.		These	families	almost	always	have	other	often	long-standing	problems	which	can	lead	to	their	children	repeating	the	cycle	of	disadvantage.		They	are	defined	as	households	who:	are	involved	in	crime	and	anti-social	behaviour;	have	children	not	in	school;	have	an	adult	on	out	of	work	benefits;	and	cause	high	costs	to	the	public	purse	(See	“The	Troubled	Families	
Programme”.	Communities	and	Local	Government.	Crown	Copyright	March	2012	
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/2117840.pdf).	At	minimum	this	work	will	involve	agencies	concerned	with	crime,	education	and	employment.	However	central	government	is	also	encouraging	LAs	to	use	their	discretion	to	consider	with	local	partners,	such	as	health,	police	and	others	what	the	range	of	issues	is	that	they	will	use	to	prioritise	and	how	to	identify	the	families.	These	include		families:	containing	a	child	who	is	on	a	Child	Protection	Plan	or	with	a	looked	after	child;	subject	to	frequent	police	call-outs	or	arrests;	and	those	with	health	problems	such	as	emotional	and	mental	health	problems,	drug	and	alcohol	misuse,	long	term	health	conditions,	those	caused	by	domestic	abuse	and	under	18	conceptions.		Policy	requires	LA	to	take	a	systematic	and	strategic	approach	to	these	most	challenging	of	families	who	have	concerned	different	services	for	years.	The	first	step	involves	complex	and	challenging	Multi-agency	services	(MAS)	work	as	the	LA	compiles	a	list	of	families	who	will	be	part	of	the	subsequent	intervention	programme.	It	also	will	involve	professionals	collecting	information	and	sharing	it	within	and	between	services	in	order	to	identify	families	with	complex	needs.	This	involves	the	collection	of	sensitive	personal	data	by	case-workers	with	a	statutory	demand	for	secure	collection,	transfer	and	retention	of	those	data.	Current	data	storage	and	representations	of	needs	vary	across	services	and	have,	in	the	past,	proved	to	be	very	difficult	to	share	(Edwards	et	al,	2009).	
In earlier  work on practices of professional learning in and for MAS it was noted that practitioners described 
taking risks involving rule-bending as responses to contradictions between emergent practices and systems of rules, 
protocols and lines of responsibility. They demonstrated the need to question the legitimacy of the existing rules in 
relation to their professional actions on increasingly complex objects of activity and the necessity of making visible 
the ways in which they worked around the barriers to action. For example, systems of referral which meant that 
organizations passed on ‘bits of the child’, as one practitioner put it, from one to the other, were opened up for 
scrutiny and criticism of how slow the respective organizations were in enabling parallel, inter-professional 
collaboration which was more responsive to the needs of children.  Rule-bending was sometimes observed, 
reflecting practitioners’ frustrations about the responsiveness of systems to new demands of child-centred 
collaborations. These were likely to be a matter of by-passing organisational hierarchies in order to make direct 
contact with the practitioner in another service who could help quickly. 
IMPLICATIONS	OF	THE	CASE	STUDIES	So	what	can	we	conclude	from	these	very	different	and	very	exceptional	case	studies?	While	they	are	very	extreme	events	and	very	different	in	their	nature,	they	are	the	very	things	that	test	the	capability	of	our	trusted	services	to	act	properly	when	called	upon	to	do	so.	Those	services	are	intended	and	strategically	planned	to	be	able	to	cope	with	and	respond	to	these	extreme	and	serious	situations.	The	procedures,	policies	and	ways	of	working	are	there	to	ensure	that	they	deliver	the	services	that	we	must	rely	upon.	Consequently,	we	are	very	concerned	when	we	find	that	there	are	some	very	common	properties	of	each,	that	transcend	the	differences,	and	which	we	have	observed	in	further	situations.		Each	of	these	case	studies	is	an	example	of	what	has	been	termed	complex	and	wicked	problems	where	the	nature	of	the	problem	itself	is	never	fully	understood	“sometimes	only	after	the	event,	as	in	the	case	of	Baby	“Peter	(in	which	the	mistreatment	leading	to	the	death	of	Peter	by	his	carers	occurred	despite	repeated	visits	by	various	social,	welfare,	health	and	other	services	in	the	UK)	and	at	other	times	not	even	after	the	event.	The	nature	of	each	of	these	case	studies,	and	the	nature	of	complex	wicked	problems	is	that	a	known	answer,	from	a	known	expert	is	not	appropriate	or	available	since	the	nature	of	the	problem	itself	is	not	understood.	Only	through	the	unfolding	of	attempts	to	take	action	is	the	nature	of	the	problem	further	disclosed.	This	brings	with	it	a	number	of	consequences;		1. The	failure	to	notice,	report	and	share	what	turns	out	to	have	been	important	data.	This	often	occurs	through	preconceived	notions	of	what	is	relevant	in	the	individual	or	the	culture	and	processes	of	the	organisations.			2. The	lack	of	agility	and	the	reluctance	or	fear	of	trying	something	new	that	is	outside	the	known	bounds	of	practice.	This	occurs	through	structural	pressures	on	the	individual	and	organisation,	and	the	lack	of	a	mechanism	to	sanction,	assure	or	approve	such	actions.	3. The	failure	of	the	whole	to	learn	rapidly	during	the	event.	This	occurs	through	rigid	and	stove-piped	lines	of	communication,	false	or	non-reporting	in	order	to	comply,	to	avoid	rebuke,	and/or	to	save	time	and	get	on	with	it.	4. An	over	reliance	upon	the	formal,	established,	specialist,	resources	and	processes	and	an	inability	to	make	effective	use	of	the	“unofficial”,	novel,	and	available.	This	occurs	through	the	misplaced	ownership	of	the	problem	being	in	the	hands	of	a	few.		
5. The	resultant	breakthroughs	that	contribute	to	solution	and	future	ways	of	working	come	from	outside	the	current	known	expertise,	processes,	and	responsibilities.				6. The	mechanisms	to,	share,	question,	reflect	and	propose	alternatives	are	not	available	to	all	but	a	few	and	often	in	highly	abstracted	and	prescribed	forms.	This	occurs	from	the	lack	of	trust,	fear	of	“information	overload”,	the	lack	of	light-weight	mechanisms,	and	the	inability	to	construct	“provenance”	from	novel	sources.	7. The	nature	of	leadership	and	command	is	often	rigid,	inflexible	and	prescriptive.	This	occurs	from	a	belief	that	command	and	leaders	must	always	appear	to	know	the	right	answer	and	be	the	ultimate	experts.	This	results	in	the	suppression	of	new	ideas,	improved	problem	solving,	and	prevents	a	culture	of	empowered	discovery.		8. The	processes	and	tools	are	often	inappropriate	and	inflexible	and	the	ability	to	appropriate	new	or	changed	tools	and	processes	is	poor.	This	occurs	from	the	lack	of	available	easily	reconfigured	and	adaptable	tools	and	processes	and	the	inability	to	allow	appropriation	of	external	tools	and	processes	for	fear	of	“damaging	the	system”.		
Meeting	those	Challenges	We	hypothesise	that	new	processes	and	technologies	can	enable	Collective	Capability	by	providing	improved	creation	gathering,	representation	and	sharing	of	information	that	enhance:	
• local	and	global		awareness	of	individuals,	teams		and	agencies	in	the	collective,	
- enhancing	the	power	and	utility	of	information	knowledge	sharing,	
- improving	the	ease	of	collection,	richness	and	rapid	assessment	of	locally	gathered	information	for	global	learning.	
• decision-making	and	decision-making	process	i.e.	
- Improving	the	production	and	sharing	information	by	individuals	and	groups,		
- Improve	the	collective	analysis	and	assessment	of	that	information,	We	believe	that	this	will	to	lead	to	improvements	in	MAS	collective	capability	in	terms	of;	improved	capability,	and	greater	effectiveness.	More	specifically,	we	postulate	that	greater	shared	awareness	and	utility	of	information,	collective	analysis	and	assessment	for	decision-making	will	increase	the	capability	and	agility	of	MAS.	It	is	important	to	note	that	these	effects	will	also	be	complex	i.e.	greater	shared	awareness	will	affect	collective	analysis	and	assessment	for	decision	making,	more	collective	decision	making	will	in	turn	lead	to	greater	shared	awareness.	Collective	Capability	will	produce	collaborative,	agile,	responsive,	and	efficient	collaborative	working.	To	achieve	this	research	must	investigate	the	socio-technological,	environmental	and	contextual	factors	that	support	collective	capability	in	MAS.		Such	research	must	employ	a	range	of	theoretical	and	methodological	perspectives.	We	argue	that	much	understanding	and	insight	is	to	be	gained	from	bringing	together	Activity	Theory,	Collective	Intelligence	and	Human	Computer	Interaction	theory	and	methods	to	understand	the	interaction	between	the	processes,	technologies,	the	end	users,	their	work	and	Collective	Capability.		
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